978-1-4222-3442-6

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I RAQ

Saddam said, but they also were closely allied with Syria. Over the next two weeks, dozens of government officials and accused traitors were executed. President al-Bakr quietly slipped from the political scene, claiming ill health. Saddam’s authority soon became total. The people who were loyal to him were promoted to powerful positions in the govern- ment. In exchange, they agreed with him and supported his power grab. Saddam’s most trusted officials were those who came from his hometown, Tikrit, and were members of his own family or tribe. Saddam dealt strongly with any opposition. When Shiite Muslim religious leaders in southern Iraq encouraged resistance to the gov- ernment, Saddam had some leading clerics killed and many others arrested. He accused numerous Shiites of supporting Iraq’s rival, Iran, and thousands were forced to leave the country and move into Iran. After their deportation, their homes and belongings were sold. Saddam had reason to be concerned about affairs in Iran. The pro-Western government of the shah had been overthrown in early 1979 by supporters of the radical Shiite cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Khomeini had instituted a theocratic Shiite Muslim gov- ernment. In the wake of Iran’s Islamic Revolution, he encouraged Shiites in other countries to revolt against their leaders. Saddam Hussein’s concern about the loyalty of his own Shiite population was warranted—he had ruthlessly oppressed the Shiites. Even before the Baath Party came to power, however, Shiites had been second-class citizens in Iraq, and they resented repression by the country’s secular governments. The Sunni-Shiite split was not the only dimension to the ani- mosity between Iran and Iraq. The people of Mesopotamia had been at odds with the many Persian peoples to their east for millennia. And there was a personal element as well—Khomeini hated Saddam Hussein and his secular regime, while Saddam detested the ayatollah and his theocratic rule. Perhaps most important,