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the previous year’s yield. Not to be outdone, another provin- cial official reported a tenfold increase. These reports weren’t true. The 1958 harvests were actual- ly smaller than in previous years. But commune managers

Key Idea

Communist governments often rely on propaganda—inaccurate information that is intended to show the Party in a positive light.

and provincial officials were eager to advance their careers. They wanted to exceed the expectations of Party leaders. From Beijing, China’s capital, Mao and the CCP leadership made no attempt to verify the reports coming in from the coun- tryside. The miraculous harvests seemed to prove that the sys- tem they had set up was working. Under the Chinese government’s scheme for grain distribu- tion, each commune kept part of what it grew: a base amount that was thought to be enough to feed the commune’s mem- bers, plus a portion of any surplus. The commune had to turn the rest over to the government. After feeding people in China’s cities, the government exported most of the remaining grain. Unfortunately, when a commune manager exaggerated the harvest, some of the grain taken by the government wasn’t actually surplus. It was part of the base amount needed to feed commune members. By early 1959, hunger stalked the Chinese countryside. The weakest people—the elderly and the very young—began dying. A few Party officials tried to sound a warning. One was China’s defense minister, Peng Dehuai. Peng understood the depth of the crisis after touring his native province of Hunan.

Nightmare in China

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