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scientists were asked to develop more computing capacity to meet the needs of the military. In 1953, the year Eisenhower took office, government and industry in the United States spent roughly $5.6 billion on various scientific research and development (R&D) programs. That number skyrocketed to $165.3 billion by the end of the Cold War in 1992. After the war, U.S. allies were also on the move techno- logically. However, they operated independently in one key area—nuclear weapons. At the beginning of the Cold War, the McMahon Act, which went into effect in 1947, restricted non– U.S. scientists from accessing information on nuclear research. The arrangement created a rift between the United States and Britain and led to Britain developing its own nuclear weapons program. In 1958, the U.S. Congress enacted a law that eased restrictions on sharing information, which began a closer alli- ance between the two countries on mutual security issues. The French also took on amore independent way of think- ing when it came to science and technology. Devastated and impoverished by World War II, the French, despite opposition from the United States, quickly embarked on their own nucle- ar weapons program. It was slow going, but by 1960 France had become a nuclear power, and it would soon become one of the world’s largest producers of nuclear energy. Figuring out what the Soviet Union spent on scientific research and development was always problematic because of the Russian tendency toward secrecy. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, however, estimated that the Soviets spent an average of $75.8 billion a year on “military pro- grams” between 1951 and 1964. The United States spent $86 billion a year. Between 1965 and 1989, the Soviets spent an average of $252 billion a year, while the United States spent $242 billion. In Communist China, scientific development had a more practical need as party leaders tried tomodernize industry, ag- riculture, and national defense. The idea was to be self-reliant. Sciencemeant something totally different to the Chinese than to Americans and Soviets. As one historian put it, figuring out how to use manure could count as “scientific farming.” For the Chinese, science had become a part of the revolution, which could free the country from archaic ways of thinking.

IN THEIR OWN WORDS U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower On the “Military-Industrial Complex” This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence—economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every statehouse, every office of the federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society. In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether

sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. — From Eisenhower’s final public address as president, January 17, 1961.

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CHAPTER 1