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Chapter One THE BATTLE OF KURSK

T he destruction of the 6th Army in Stalingrad proved that the Germans were not invincible and that the Soviets had an effective army, while the Battle of Kursk five months later showed that Germany could not hope to win the war with the USSR. This great armored clash was the last time that Germany was able to take the initiative on the Eastern Front. Fighting on ground of their own choosing, and at a time they considered best for their tactics, the German armies were first halted and then thrown back by the size and skill of the constantly improving Soviet forces. With the spring thaw in March 1943, operations on the Eastern Front came to a temporary halt, and the Germans at last had the time to plan their next move, although the planning staffs in Germany were severely taxed as to what this move might be. The Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW, or armed forces high command), which ran the German war effort in every theater but the USSR, was of the opinion that the German armies

Words to Understand Kursk: A city in the south-west of Russia. Salient: An outwardly projecting and fortified line of defense. Steppe: A level and treeless zone in Europe or Asia.

Hitler agreed with the OKH, principally because he felt that a striking victory was needed to bolster the flagging spirits of his European allies. Once they had decided that a limited offensive was needed, the OKH planners decided that the best place to strike such a blow was the great salient jutting into the German lines west of Kursk. The trouble was that this was an obvious choice for such an offensive, so speed of planning and execution was vital if tactical surprise was to be achieved. The German plan was in essence simple, and was based on the familiar pincer theory. Field-Marshal Walther Model’s 9th Army of Army Group Center, commanded by Field-Marshal Günther von Kluge, was to advance on Kursk from the northern half of the salient, while Colonel-General Hermann Hoth’s 4th Panzerarmee and General Wilhelm Kempf’s Armeeabteilung Kempf, both supplied by Field-Marshal Erich von Manstein’s Army Group South, were to advance on Kursk from the south. The Central and Voronezh Fronts would be trapped in the salient and then destroyed, after which German forces would be freed for service in the west. The OKH wished the offensive, codenamed Zitadelle (citadel), to take place as early in April as possible after the spring mud had dried out enough to

there should go over to the strategic defensive, and so free forces for the western theaters, in which the great Allied invasion was expected shortly. The Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH, or army high command), which ran the war against the USSR under Hitler’s overall supervision, agreed with OKW to a certain extent, but thought it essential that there be a limited German offensive in the USSR during the summer to spoil any Soviet intentions for offensive action.

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