9781422279076

The Battle of Kursk 9th Army totaled some six Panzer, one Panzergrenadier and 14 infantry divisions, although only eight of the infantry divisions were to be used in Zitadelle. Supported by some 730 aircraft of Luftflotte 6’s 1st Fliegerdivision, the 9th Army was able to field about 900 tanks, although most of these were obsolescent PzKpfw II, PzKpfw III, and early PzKpfw IV types. In the south, von Manstein had more numerous and better-equipped forces: nine Panzer, two Panzergrenadier and 11 infantry divisions, although only seven of the infantry divisions were to be used in the planned offensive. More significantly, von Manstein’s forces had some 1,000 tanks and 150 assault guns, these armored fighting vehicles including about 200 of the new PzKpfw V Panther battle tanks and 94 of the new and even more powerful PzKpfw Tiger I heavy tanks. Air support was provided by the 1,100 aircraft of Luftflotte 4’s VIII Fliegerkorps. Artillery support comprised some 6,000 guns and mortars in the north, and 4,000 weapons in the south. This was a formidable offensive force but one with distinct limitations. The most important of these were the fact that many formations had only recently been reorganized after the debacle at Stalingrad and Germany’s subsequent defeat in the south. They had not achieved their true potential as

disadvantage of having no defensive machine gun with which to ward off close-range infantry attack. Even so, the Soviets were leaving nothing to chance, and were massing truly enormous forces in the Kursk salient for the forthcoming battle. The overall plan was devised by Georgi Zhukov, promoted to Marshal of the Soviet Union in January 1943. Zhukov was not content with merely stopping the Germans’ attempt to eliminate the Kursk salient. Once the German forces were firmly embedded in the Soviet defenses of the salient proper, massive offensives were to be launched into the German counter-salients north and south of Kursk in the regions of Orel and Kharkov. The whole Soviet front was then to grind forward remorselessly. In the Kursk salient proper, the Soviets had had four months in which to prepare their defenses, based on a series of very strong field fortifications. The first line consisted of five lines of trenches some 3 miles (5km) deep, reinforced with numerous antitank strongpoints. In this area, antitank and antipersonnel mines were laid at a density of 2,400 and 2,700 mines per mile of front. Some 7 miles (11km) behind the first line lay a similar second line, with a strong third line 20 miles (32km) behind the second. Behind

fighting units as yet, trained reserves and replacements were in short supply, and although Hitler and the staff generals had high expectations of the new armored vehicles, Guderian and the front-line commanders were all too aware that these had been rushed into premature action, and were still very prone to teething troubles. The Panther, Tiger, and Elefant were all somewhat unreliable mechanically, the Elefant suffering from the distinct tactical

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